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Introduction 
In presenting the situation of a health professional witnessing an instance of misdiagnosis and 
mistreatment in a television documentary, we hoped to stimulate discussion of the professional 
responsibilities of health workers in informal encounters in a rapidly changing environment comprising 
print, television, and more recently social media platforms. The commentaries on our paper do not 
disappoint in this respect, providing insightful and sometimes challenging reactions to the position we 
outlined in response to our original case. In our reply here, we choose to focus on two themes running 
through all of the commentaries: 1) the distinction between axiological and deontic perspectives 
invoked by Salloch, and the open-endedness of the former that we see as crucial in addressing the 
constantly-changing media landscape through which health workers may confront medical need; and 2) 
the role of institutional, structural and social factors in constraining or enabling virtuous professional 
practice  W suggesting perhaps a further need for health workers to take action directly against structural 
injustices that prevent them from fulfilling their professional responsibilities. 
Axiological and deontic perspectives on professional responsibility 
Salloch introduces the distinction between axiological and deontic perspectives on ethics, and we find 
this a useful heuristic to explore the motivations behind the account we offer. Aligned with (but distinct 
ĨƌŽŵ ?ƚŚĞĐůĂƐƐŝĐĚŝƐƚŝŶĐƚŝŽŶďĞƚǁĞĞŶƚŚĞ ?ŐŽŽĚ ?ĂŶĚƚŚĞ ?ƌŝŐŚƚ ? ?ƚŚĞĂǆŝŽůŽŐŝĐĂůƉĞƌƐƉĞĐƚŝǀĞĨŽĐƵƐĞƐŽŶ
states of affairs  W whether embodied in the attributes of particular individuals or communities, or 
distributions of certain goods  W and considers which of these are better or worse; while the deontic 
concentrates predominantly on the categorization of human actions into duties, responsibilities, 
prohibitions and the like (Heyd 2016). 
While Salloch suggests that we focus on the axiological at the expense of the deontic, we are in fact 
drawn toward the instrumental VE we present in the original paper in large part because of the 
shortcomings of deontic attempts to address the challenges of our original case in sufficient detail; we 
note that professional guidance and legal frameworks for practice provided little assistance, and 
established techniques for extrapolating from explicit guidance such as specification, casuistry, and 
balancing also proved unsatisfactory (Wardrope & Reuber, forthcoming, p.xx). Several commentaries 
provided further demonstration of the difficulties for deontic approaches to a wide range of problems 
arising in informal situations in medical ethics. ƌŶŽůĚ ?ƐĨŽĐƵƐŽŶƚŚĞƌĞƐƉŽŶƐŝďŝůŝƚŝĞƐŽĨŚĞĂůƚŚƐĞƌǀŝĐĞ
volunteers working in different cultures brings to the fore the moral salience of close attendance to 
socio-cultural difference and respect for host community norms in working in these contexts (Arnold 
xxxx). ŐŐůĞƐŽŶ ?ƐƌĞƐƉŽŶƐĞ ?ŐŐůĞƐŽŶǆǆǆǆ ?, meanwhile, issues a challenge that demonstrates the urgent 
need for a professional ethics capable of handling the rapid expansion of social media and the array of 
different ways in which it may expose health workers to illness narratives. While we do not claim even 
to have scratched the surface of what this range of new scenarios confronting health workers may 
demand of them  W an important subject for future work in this area  W we believe that the combination 
of the flexibility of an agent-oriented, axiological framework such as VE, and the focus on an external, 
democratically accountable collective objective such as that provided by consequentialist or social 
contract foundations for professional responsibility, will be important tools in developing a more 
substantive account. Furthermore, the stricter constraints of explicit rules for conduct typical of the 
deontic perspective will struggle to cope with two distinct needs: for sensitive engagement with subtle 
but morally relevant cross-cultural or cross-platform differences on the one hand; and the expanding 
range of environments in which health workers may find their services called upon, on the other.  
Beyond these general difficulties the deontic perspective faces in engaging with the subtleties of 
professional responsibilities in informal medicine, we find that the particular balance between the 
axiological and deontic suggested by Salloch  W using the classification of such responsibilities as 
 ?ƐƵƉĞƌĞƌŽŐĂƚŽƌǇ ? W confronts an additional problem. On many externalist accounts, professional 
responsibilities are individual contributions to coordinated actions that jointly serve to discharge a 
collective responsibility (Wardrope & Reuber p.xx). The problem for supererogation in this framework is 
that, for individuals working to discharge these responsibilities as part of the collective, supererogatory 
acts are  ?ŶŽƚďĂĚŶŽƚƚŽĚŽ ?. Much work on collective moral responsibility draws attention to the fact 
that individually-innocent acts can, on aggregation, cause serious harm; ignoring the moral significance 
of sets ŽĨĂĐƚƐŝƐĞƌĞŬWĂƌĨŝƚ ?ƐƐĞĐŽŶĚ ?ŵŝƐƚĂŬĞŝŶŵŽƌĂůŵĂƚŚĞŵĂƚŝĐƐ ?(Parfit 1986), which can have 
notoriously high costs in confronting structural injustices like anthropogenic climate change (Sinnott-
Armstrong 2005; Jamieson 2007). Supererogation  W by absolving individuals of direct responsibility to 
act, even where there is a collective responsibility to avoid the outcomes of inaction  W commits this 
second moral mistake. It is for this reason that we highlight the importance of non-complacency in an 
instrumental VE fit for healthcare professionals (Wardrope & Reuber p.xx).It acknowledges that 
discharging our collective responsibilities sometimes does require of individuals that they go beyond the 
usual obligations of their role in order to serve better the health interests of the public to which the 
profession is responsible. This may be particularly the case for professionals whose clinical expertise or 
social roles (e.g. as representative of patient advocacy group or professional organization) are 
particularly relevant to a given case; a subject for future work on this topic will be to explore how 
virtuous responses to scenarios such as ours vary amongst health workers with such variables. 
While we struggle with application of supererogation as a means of balancing deontic and axiological 
perspectives, other commentarists highlight an alternative means by which the deontic perspective can 
ďĞŝŶǀŽŬĞĚƚŽƉƌŽǀŝĚĞĨƵƌƚŚĞƌŐƵŝĚĂŶĐĞƚŽŝŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂůŚĞĂůƚŚǁŽƌŬĞƌƐ ?ĚĞůŝďĞƌĂƚŝŽŶƐǁŝƚŚŝŶŽƵƌďƌŽĂĚer 
axiological framework; using established norms from relevantly similar  W if importantly distinct  W cases 
ĂƐ ?ŝŶƚƵŝƚŝŽŶƉƵŵƉƐ ?ŝŶŐƵŝĚŝŶŐĂƉƉƌĂŝƐĂůŽĨƚŚĞŵŽƌĂůůǇƐĂůŝĞŶƚĨĞĂƚƵƌĞƐŽĨĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶƚƐŝƚƵĂƚŝŽŶƐĂŶĚ
appropriate responses to them. While we agree with other critics that casuistry glosses over the details 
in which the devil resides that separate problĞŵĐĂƐĞƐĨƌŽŵ ?ĞĂƐŝĞƌ ?ĞǆĞŵƉůĂƌƐ(DeMarco and Ford 2006, 
490), using a range of such similar cases as different, complementary lenses through which to view a 
given problem and aid deliberation can instead bring a range of different details into clearer focus. 
^ĂŶŬĂƌǇĂŶĚ&ŽƌĚ ?ƐĐŽŵŵĞŶƚĂƌǇƉƌŽǀŝĚĞƐĂŶĂďůĞĚĞŵŽŶƐƚƌĂƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚŝƐƉƌŽĐĞƐƐĂƚǁŽƌŬ ?ŚŝŐŚůŝŐŚƚŝŶŐ
ŚŽǁĨƵƌƚŚĞƌƌĞĨůĞĐƚŝŽŶŽŶƚŚĞƐŝŵŝůĂƌŝƚŝĞƐďĞƚǁĞĞŶŽƵƌĐĂƐĞĂŶĚƚŚĞĐůĂƐƐŝĐ ?'ŽŽĚ^ĂŵĂƌŝƚĂŶ ?ƐĐĞŶĂƌŝŽ
draws attention to subtleties neglected on our initial analysis. These might aid deliberation for the 
health worker confronted by obstacles to their initial response (Sankary and Ford xxx). 
Teaching and practicing virtue in institutional contexts 
In a footnote to our original paper, we raised the question of how emphasizing virtue in professional 
education and practice might force a reappraisal of how ethics and professionalism are traditionally 
taught, with a renewed emphasis on the institutional, structural, and social factors that support or 
constrain virtuous practice. We are very pleased to note that several of the commentaries were able to 
ĚĞǀĞůŽƉƚŚŝƐƚŚĞŵĞĨƵƌƚŚĞƌ ?/ŶƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌ ?ďŽƚŚ'ƌĂĨĂŶĚDŝůůĞƌ ?ƐĂŶĚ^ĂŶŬĂƌǇĂŶĚ&ŽƌĚ ?ƐƌĞƐƉŽŶƐĞƐĚƌĂǁ
attention to the ways in which intrusion of market norms into the field of healthcare may erode the 
capacity for health workers to practise virtuously. 
The claim that the expansion of market methods (such as financial competition and cash incentives) can 
be damaging to societal spheres not previously subject to the norms of the free market is well-
established, if still controversial. For instance, Michael Sandel famously argues that the introduction of 
market incentives and mechanisms into areas of human social existence not previously operating on a 
commercial basis can be corrosive to the norms that otherwise would govern those areas, often with 
detrimental effects (Sandel 2012). The responses of Graf and Miller and Sankary and Ford present a 
salutary warning about the dangers of commercialized healthcare for both professional virtue and 
healthcare journalism.  
dŚĞĐĂƐĞĚĞƐĐƌŝďĞĚďǇ'ƌĂĨĂŶĚDŝůůĞƌŽĨĂƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌůǇĞŐƌĞŐŝŽƵƐǀŝŽůĂƚŝŽŶŽĨĂĨĂŵŝůǇ ?ƐƉƌŝǀĂĐǇĂƚĂ
difficult time demonstrates how commercial interests can override even well-entrenched social norms 
around voyeurism and respect for the dead (Graf and Miller xxxx). They correctly observe that it is not 
only the journalists who are to be held responsible here  W increasingly-commercialised healthcare 
providers acquiesce to the filming of such documentaries in part hoping that the resulting footage will 
ŚĞůƉƚŽĂĚǀĞƌƚŝƐĞƚŚĞŝƌƐĞƌǀŝĐĞƐƚŽĨƌĞƐŚ “ĐŽŶƐƵŵĞƌƐ ?ŽĨŚĞĂůƚŚĐĂƌĞ ?dŚĞŝƌƉĞƐƐŝŵŝƐƚŝĐĐŽŶĐůƵƐŝŽŶƚŚĂƚ
well-informed and educational health communication is unlikely to succeed as long as narrow 
commercial considerations dictate what is broadcast challenges health workers to reflect on whether 
they must act to protect their patients from the potentially corrupting influence of market forces. 
ŵŽƌĞĚŝƌĞĐƚĚĞŵŽŶƐƚƌĂƚŝŽŶŽĨŵĂƌŬĞƚǀĂůƵĞƐ ?ĐƌŽǁĚŝŶŐŽƵƚ ?ƉƌŽĨĞƐƐŝŽŶĂůŵŽƌĂůƐŝŶŚĞĂůƚŚĐĂƌĞ is 
provided in concerns raised by Sankary and Ford. In the UK  W the context in which the present authors 
both work  W healthcare is overwhelmingly delivered on a publicly-funded, universally-accessible basis via 
the National Health Service (NHS). Within this context, other health workers are still primarily viewed as 
collaborators rather than competitors (despite unpopular reforms introducing market elements) and 
ƚŚĞƌĞŝƐůŝƚƚůĞŝŶĐĞŶƚŝǀĞĨŽƌ ?ƉŽĂĐŚŝŶŐ ?ƉĂƚŝĞŶƚƐĨƌŽŵŽƚŚĞƌƉƌŽǀŝĚĞƌƐ ?^ĂŶŬĂƌǇĂŶĚ&ŽƌĚ ?ŚŽǁĞǀer, 
highlight the reality of such practices in the US healthcare marketplace, and thus the danger of market 
incentives perverting the motives of doctors drawn to intervene in cases such as the one we describe. 
The operation of the profit motive within US healthcare, then, can make the moral landscape far more 
difficult for the clinician to navigate. In considering how to enable virtuous practice amongst health 
ǁŽƌŬĞƌƐ ?^ĂŶŬĂƌǇĂŶĚ&ŽƌĚ ?ƐĞǆĂŵƉle highlights the importance not only of training individual health 
workers, but also of attending to how healthcare institutions are constructed and the role they permit 
their workers to play within society. 
While we have focused here on marketization as a social threat to individual professional virtue, there 
are other, non-financial, institutional factors that can enable or constrain individual virtuous practice. 
For example, in discussing our example with working clinicians, several have expressed concerns that an 
individualistic, blame-focused response to medical error would severely hamper the effectiveness of any 
potential response to addressing the errors displayed in our original case. As we originally argued, the 
front-line workers who are the proximate causes of clinical error (such as the doctors who misdiagnosed 
and mistreated the patient in our scenario) are rarely the sole or most important causes of that error, 
and an effective response demands that we address the systematic weaknesses that propagate through 
different organizational levels to result in these mistakes. But where institutions are inclined to 
scapegoat individuals rather than reflect on their own weaknesses, health workers may be 
correspondingly less likely to respond to witnessed error for fear that their colleagues would be unjustly 
punished  W or indeed that they may face retribution as some high-ƉƌŽĨŝůĞ ?ǁŚŝƐƚůĞďůŽǁĞƌƐ ?ĐůĂŝŵƚŽŚĂǀĞ
faced. In the wake of serious failures in the standard of care at Stafford Hospital in the United Kingdom, 
the official Francis inquiry (Francis 2013) and many professional and civil society responses emphasized 
ƚŚĞŶĞĞĚĨŽƌĂ ?ũƵƐƚĐƵůƚƵƌĞ ?ŝŶŚĞĂůƚŚĐĂƌĞŝŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶƐƚŽƉƌŽƚĞĐƚĂŐĂŝŶƐƚƐƵĐŚĨĂŝůŝŶŐƐ ?ďƵƚŵĂŶǇŚĞĂůƚŚ
workers feel like such a culture has yet to be realized, and that this presents a serious barrier to their 
virtuous practice, in formal encounters or informal ones such as our scenario. 
Conclusion 
In our reply we have focused on two particular themes found throughout the commentaries that we feel 
may be most pertinent toward developing a more substantive theory of individual and collective 
professional responsibilities outside the formal professional-patient relationships of the clinical context. 
Clearly  W as Eggleson argues  W this is an important topic for health workers and healthcare ethicists to 
address now, before we are left still further behind by new technological developments. 
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